In an experiment, choice-based utility of money is derived from choices under risk, 15 and choiceless utility from introspective strength-of-preference judgments. The well-16 known inconsistencies of risky utility that result if the data are analyzed in terms of 17 expected utility are resolved if the data are analyzed in terms of prospect theory. One 18 consistent cardinal utility index for risky choice then results. Remarkably, this 19 cardinal index also agrees well with the choiceless utilities. This finding suggests a 20 relation between a choice-based and a choiceless concept. Such a relation would 21 imply that introspective judgments can provide useful data for economics, and can 22 reinforce the revealed-preference paradigm. Implications for the classical debate on 23 ordinal versus cardinal utility are discussed. 24 25 *
reinforce the revealed-preference paradigm. Implications for the classical debate on 23 ordinal versus cardinal utility are discussed. 24 25 utility in question governs risky decisions. Table 1 when the views of utility changed profoundly due to the ordinal revolution. 151
Economists became concerned about the empirical observability of utility. Utility was 152 related to observable choice and all associations with introspective psychological 153 judgments were abandoned. This development changed the status of utility from 154 being ad hoc to being empirically well founded. Along with the concern for 155 TABLE 1. Various concepts of utility. The utilities within boxes are commonly required to be restricted to their domains, and not to be applied in other domains.
: A relation between these two is obtained in this paper. It extends vNM (von Neumann-Morgenstern) risky utility beyond risk, and connects an economic, middlecolumn, concept with a "non-economic," right-column concept.
Choice-based Choiceless ordinal utility positivism, became popular in psychology, where behaviorism was propagated by 169 Watson (1913) , Skinner (1971) , and others. 170
New hope for the existence of cardinal utility was raised by von Neumann and 171 Morgenstern (1944) , who derived cardinal utility for decision under risk; earlier 172 presentations of this idea were given by Ramsey (1931) and Zeuthen (1937) . After 173 some debates, the consensus became that this risky index is cardinal in the 174 mathematical sense of being unique up to unit and origin, but not cardinal in the sense 175 of being the neo-classical index of goodness that emerged at the end of the 19 th 176 century (Friedman and Savage 1948; Baumol 1958 p. 655; Varian 1993) . 2 Ordinalism 177 has continued to dominate in mainstream economics ever since. 178 179
Ordinal versus Cardinal Utility after 1950 180
This section describes the history of utility in the second half of the twentieth century, 181 which followed after the classic historical review by Stigler (1950) 
and after von 182
Neumann and Morgenstern's contribution. 183 prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) , agree. Gul's (1991) disappointment 280 theory also agrees with these theories on our domain of two-outcome prospects, and, 281 therefore, our conclusions hold under this theory as well. On the domain considered, 282 original prospect theory is not subject to the theoretical problems that have been 283 pointed out for other choices (Handa 1977; Fishburn 1978) . The normalization U(0) 284 = 0, necessary in prospect theory when loss outcomes are present, is not required in 285 our domain because it does not affect preferences here. 286
Similar to the utility function, the function w is subjective and depends on the 287 individual, reflecting sensitivity towards probabilities. Many empirical investigations 288 have studied the shape of w. Under expected utility, all risk aversion has to be captured through concave 308 utility whereas under the descriptively more realistic prospect theory, part of the 309 observed risk aversion is due to probability weighting. This suggests that classical 310 estimations of utility are overly concave. A theoretical justification for this claim was 311 provided by Rabin (2000) . Our paper will provide data that supports Rabin's claims, 312 and will show that prospect theory can explain these data. 313 program, in the presence of the experimenter. The participants were familiar with 323 probabilities and expectations but had not received a training in decision theory before 324 the experiment. Prior to the experimental questions, the participants were 325 familiarized with the stimuli through some practice questions. Three participants 326
were discarded because they gave erratic answers and apparently did not understand 327 the instructions; N = 47 participants remained. 328
Our choice-based method concerns risky choices. Only degenerate or two-329 outcome prospects were used. They were displayed as pie charts on a computer 330 screen, where different colors were used to designate different areas; see Appendix A. 331
The units of payment in the prospects were French Francs. At the beginning of the 332 experiment, a random device repeatedly picked random points from the pie charts so 333 as to familiarize the participants with the representation of probabilities used in this 334 experiment. 335
The measurements of this paper are based on indifferences. It is well known that 336 observations of indifferences are prone to many biases, in particular if derived from 337 direct matching. Indifferences derived from choices seem to be less prone to biases 338 (Bostic, We used a within-subject design, with all measurements carried out for all 344 individuals. All statistical analyses are based on within-subject differences. The 345 tradeoff method was always carried out before the other methods because its answers 346 served as inputs in further elicitations, so as to simplify the comparisons. The order 347 of the other methods was counterbalanced so as to minimize systematic memory 348 effects, which is especially important for the strength of preference measurements. 349 (FF 1 ≈ $0.17). For each participant, the outcome t 1 > t 0 was assessed such that (⅓,t 1 ; 353 r) ~ (⅓,t 0 ; R). Next, t 2 > t 1 was assessed such that (⅓,t 2 ; r) ~ (⅓,t 1 ; R), …, and, 354 finally, t 6 > t 5 was assessed such that (⅓,t 6 ; r) ~ (⅓,t 5 ; R). Under prospect theory, the 355 indifferences imply the five equalities U(t 6 ) − U(t 5 ) = ... = U(t 1 ) − U(t 0 ), independently 356 of how the participant transforms probabilities (Wakker & Deneffe 1996) . Because 357 EU is a special case of PT with a linear weighting function, the five equalities also 358 hold under EU. Setting, as throughout this paper, U(t 0 ) = 0 and U(t 6 ) = 1, we obtain 359 the following equalities. 360
The TO observations can be interpreted as direct observations of the inverse utility 362 function, with t i = U inv (i/6) for all i. 363
Our choiceless method for measuring utility is based on direct strength-of-364 preference judgments (SP method). For each participant, an amount s 2 was assessed 365 such that the strength of preference between s 2 and t 1 was judged to be the same as 366 between t 1 and t 0 , the values obtained from the TO method (for details see Appendix 367 A). Similarly, we elicited amounts s 3 , ..., s 6 such that the strength of preference 368 between s i and s i−1 was judged to be the same as that between t 1 and t 0 , for all i. 369
Following Alt (1936) and others, the SP method assumes that strength-of-preference 370 judgments correspond with utility differences, implying 371
Using the scaling convention U(t 1 )−U(t 0 ) = 1/6 (as in Eq. 5.1), we have 373
Note that these strength-of-preference measurements indeed do not involve observed 375 choices in the sense of revealed preferences (Samuelson 1938a; Varian 1993 From a psychological perspective, it is not surprising that the choice-based and 434 choiceless utilities measured in this paper agree, because the TO method appeals to a 435 perception of preference in an indirect manner: In the indifference (⅓,t i ; r) ~ (⅓,t i−1 ; 436 R), a perceived strength of preference between t i and t i−1 , associated with probability 437 ⅓, offsets the same counterargument of receiving R instead of r, associated with 438 probability 2/3, for each i. Because the relevant probabilities are the same for each i, 439 it is plausible that the perceived strength of preference between t i and t i−1 is the same 440 for each i (Wakker & Deneffe 1996) . In this way, it is not surprising that the TO and 441 SP methods gave similar results. used, it is plausible that they will be different for certainty equivalents than for the TO 478 and SP methods, and that they will not generate the same utilities. The third method 479 considered prospects that assign probability 1/3 to the best outcome. The reason for 480 this particular choice of probability will be explained at the end of this section. The 481 third method is called the CE 1/3 method. Amounts c 2 , c 1 , and c 3 were elicited such 482 that c 2 ~ (⅓,t 6 ; t 0 ), c 1 ~ (⅓,c 2 ; t 0 ), and c 3 ~ (⅓,t 6 ; c 2 ). 483
We first analyze this method in the classical manner, i.e., assuming EU. We will 484 see later that the following equalities and analysis remain valid under prospect theory. 
D. 496
At this point, two concerns can be raised. First, it may be argued that the 497 assumption of EU used in the preceding analysis is not descriptively valid. Second, it 498 may be conjectured that our design does not have the statistical power to detect 499 differences (apart from nonlinearity of the utility curves). To investigate these 500 concerns, we used a fourth method for measuring utility, another certainty-equivalent 501 method. This method considered prospects that assign probability 2/3 to the best 502 outcome and is, therefore, called the We assume the probability weighting function of Figure 1 for all individuals. This 522 assumption obviously is an approximation because in reality the probability weighting 523 function will depend on the individual. The descriptive performance of prospect 524 theory could be improved if information about individual probability weighting were 525 available. In the absence of such information, we expect that, on average, PT with the 526 probability weighting function of Figure 1 will yield better results than EU, which 527 also assumes that the weighting function is the same for all individuals but, 528 furthermore, assumes that it is linear. Let us repeat that the analysis of the TO method 529 remains valid under PT, irrespective of the individual probability weighting functions. 530 Therefore, contrary to the CE methods, it is not affected by individual variations in 531 probability weighting. lottery equivalent method may be explained by a bias upward due to scale 624 compatibility that has been found to bias probability matching questions (Bleichrodt 625 2002) . The data of the two methods discussed here were noisier than those of the 626 other methods, and these two methods have not been widely used in the literature. 627 Therefore, we do not report their details. They are available in Barrios (2003) . appealing feature of the ⅓ probability that it does not lead to systematic probability 638 transformations in CE questions. Finally, Rabin (2000) argued on theoretical grounds 639 that utility is more linear than commonly thought, and that most of the commonly 640 observed risk aversion is due to factors other than utility curvature. 641
Rabin's argument is based on a paradox entailing that, if risk attitude is based 642 solely on utility curvature as in expected utility, then a moderate and realistic degree 643 of risk aversion for moderate stakes necessarily implies an extreme and unrealistic 644 degree of risk aversion for high stakes. We used prospect theory, where risk attitude 645 consists of other factors besides utility curvature, to estimate the utility function. Our 646 empirical findings of moderate utility curvature confirm Rabin's predictions. Our 647 contribution to Rabin's paradox is to demonstrate that not only does it refute expected 648 utility, but also it can be accommodated by prospect theory. way of studying such relationships. 672
We only compared risky choice-based utilities to riskless choiceless utilities 673 derived from strengths of preferences, and we did not consider utilities derived from 674 other tradeoffs such as interpersonal or intertemporal. We hope that future empirical 675 studies will consider such other tradeoffs, and that Birnbaum and Broome's scale 676 convergence can be established with one unified concept of utility relevant to many 677 domains in social sciences. Then the use of choiceless data in applications, such as 678 health economics, can become more acceptable to mainstream economists and 679 ordinalists, not only for pragmatic reasons (Manski 2004 ), but also conceptually. 680 681
Conclusion 682
In the classical economic debate between cardinalists and ordinalists, the latter 683 assumed that direct judgments, having no preference basis, are not meaningful. In the 684 light of today's advances in experimental methods in economics, the question whether 685 relations exist between direct judgments and preferences can be investigated 686 empirically. The first investigations of such relations were conducted in decision 687 theory. These investigations assumed expected utility theory, so that their results 688 were distorted by the descriptive deficiencies of this theory. Prospect theory provided 689 descriptive improvements. Using this theory, our experiment suggests a simple 690 relation between direct strength-of-preference judgments and risky-decision utilities. 691
If an empirical relationship between direct judgments and preferences can be 692 firmly established, then direct judgments will provide useful data for economic 693 analyses in contexts where preferences are hard to measure because of choice 694 anomalies (Kahneman 1994) . Conversely, such links provide a consistency basis for 695 direct judgments. The result will be that direct judgments reinforce the revealed 696 preference approach and vice versa. We, therefore, hope for further empirical 697 investigations of the relations between direct judgments and revealed preferences. 698 reliable indifferences. We first consider the measurement of t 1 for the TO method. That 702 is, a value x (= t 1 ) was to be found to yield an indifference A = (1/3,5000; 2000) ~ 703
(1/3,x; 1000) = B. The scrollbar was again placed at its initial value x = 5000, where B is dominated 713 by A. The experimenter increased x until the participant was no longer sure that she 714 prefers A. Next a smaller outcome x was found for which the participant was still sure 715 to prefer A to B, say x = a > 5000. Similarly, an outcome x of B was found for which 716 the participant was sure to prefer B to A, say x = b < 25000. Obviously, b > a; if not, 717 the participant did not understand the procedure and it was repeated. Thus, an interval 718 [a, b] was obtained that contained the indifference value t 1 . We wanted this interval to 719 be of the same length for all participants. Hence, we asked participants to be more 720 precise if their interval [a, b] was too long. Commonly it was shorter, in which case the 721 computer automatically enlarged it. In this manner, an interval of a fixed length was 722 obtained for the second step. t 2 ,…,t 6 were elicited similarly. For the CE measurements we used the same way to 803 elicit indifferences as for the TO measurements, now with one option being riskless. 804
For the strength-of-preference measurements, a similar two-stage procedure was used 805 but the stimuli were different because no prospects were involved. Figures 7 and 8  806 show the screens presented to the participants in the two stages. directly concern the curvature of utility, and smoothen out irregularities in the data. A 866 drawback is that the results may depend on the particular parametric families chosen. 867
The power family is defined by 868
• x r if r > 0 869
• ln(x) if r = 0 870
• −x r if r < 0. 871 A rescaling z = x/t 6 or x/(t 6 − t 0 ) does not affect the preferences and, hence, need not 872 be applied here. The translation z = x − t 0 leads to another family that will be 873 discussed later. {#This family is most commonly used in the literature, and is also 874 knows as the family of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). Our results in Table 1 is that they assume expected utility so that risk aversion generated by probability 882 weighting is (mis)modeled through concave utility.#} 883
The exponential family, also knows as the family of constant absolute risk 884 aversion (CARA), is defined by 885
• e rz if r > 0 886
• z if r = 0 887
• −e rz if r < 0 888 characterized by Nakamura (1996) . In general, these families have many parameters 946 5 So as to preserve this feature, we changed only the scale and not the location in the substitution x # z(x). Table 3 gives descriptive statistics for individual parametric estimates. Figure 4  956 in the main text depicts the optimal parametric fittings of the expo-power family for a 957 representative agent. The parameters used there are: r = 1.242 for TO, r = 1.128 for 958 SP, r = 1.206 for CE 1/3 , r = 0.393 for CE 2/3 (EU), r = 1.136 for CE 2/3 (PT). These 959 curves are based on averages of t 6 and t 1 /t 6 ,..., t 5 /t 6 for TO, s 1 /t 6 ,..., and s 6 /t 6 for SP, t 6 960 and c 1 /t 6 , c 2 /t 6 , c 3 /t 6 for CE 1/3 , and, finally, t 6 and d 1 /t 6 , d 2 /t 6 , d 3 /t 6 for CE 2/3 (EU) and 961 CE 2/3 (PT). The curves for power and exponential fittings are very similar. 962 
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